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Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games


  • Shellshear, Evan

    (Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)


This paper investigates core stability of cooperative, TU games via a fuzzy extension of the totally balanced cover of a TU game. The stability of the core of the fuzzy extension of a game, the concave extension, is shown to reflect the core stability of the original game and vice versa. Stability of the core is then shown to be equivalent to the existence of an equilibrium of a certain correspondence.

Suggested Citation

  • Shellshear, Evan, 2011. "Characterizing core stability with fuzzy games," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 410, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
  • Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:410

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Market Games in Large Economies with a Finite Number of Types," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 31(2), pages 327-342, May.
    2. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "Extendable Cooperative Games," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(6), pages 1069-1078, December.
    3. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R. & Ishihara, S. & Muto, S., 2004. "On cores and stable sets for fuzzy games," Other publications TiSEM 66dd20be-cb4b-4b6d-937e-0, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Weber, Robert J., 1994. "Games in coalitional form," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 36, pages 1285-1303 Elsevier.
    5. Yaron Azrieli & Ehud Lehrer, 2007. "On some families of cooperative fuzzy games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 1-15, September.
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    More about this item


    Fuzzy coalition; Stable set; Cooperative game; Core; Core stability; Fuzzy game;

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