IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/har/wpaper/9602.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game

Author

Listed:
  • Massimo Morelli
  • Philippe Penelle

Abstract

We analyze the problem of economic integration using a cooperative approach. By explicitly introducing time as an endogenous variable, we make sharp predictions about the timing of admission to coalitions, about the equilibrium coalition structure, about the equilibrium payoff distribution, as well as about the equilibrium length of the admission game. We derive conditions under which a union chooses different paths of admission in order to reach the optimal size; we show that the observed sequencing of admissions to the European Union is not consistent with the existence of perfectly competitive markets to price the admission of candidate countries. Welfare implications are derived.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Morelli & Philippe Penelle, 1997. "Economic Integration as a Partition Function Game," Working Papers 9702, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago.
  • Handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9602
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/about/publications/working-papers/pdf/wp_96_02.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Bert Willems, 2000. "Cournot competition in the electricity market with transmission constraints," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0004, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
    2. Laszlo A Koczy, 2000. "The Core of a Partition Function Game," Working Papers Department of Economics ces0025, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business, Department of Economics.
    3. László Á. Kóczy, 2001. "Accession Games: A Dynamic Per-Member Partition Function Aapproach," Game Theory and Information 0111002, EconWPA.
    4. repec:spr:grdene:v:19:y:2010:i:3:d:10.1007_s10726-009-9161-2 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. László Á. Kóczy, 2010. "Strategic Aspects of the 1995 and 2004 EU Enlargements," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 267-277, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    European Union; economic integration; admission; coalition; coalition structure;

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • F15 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Economic Integration

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:har:wpaper:9602. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Eleanor Cartelli). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/spuchus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.