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Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition

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  • Conconi, P.

Abstract

We examine the endogenous formation of trade blocs when markets are characterized by imperfect competition and governments use import tariffs and export subsidies to alter the strategic interactions between oligopolistic firms. Using a simple model of intra-industry trade between three ex-ante symmetric countries, we find that, while 'pure' customs unions - entailing tariff cooperation only - are stepping stones towards global free trade, 'impure' customs unions - involving the coordinated use of both tariffs and subsidies - are stumbling blocs against it.

Suggested Citation

  • Conconi, P., 2000. "Trade Bloc Formation Under Imperfect Competition," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 571, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:wrk:warwec:571
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Baldwin, Richard, 2008. "Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    COMPETITION ; TRADE ; TARIFFS;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L50 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - General

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