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Big-Think Regionalism: A Critical Survey

Listed author(s):
  • Richard Baldwin

Small Think Regionalism focused on the Vinerian question: "Would a nation gain from joining a trade bloc?" Big Think Regionalism considers regionalism's systemic impact on the world trading system, focusing mainly on two questions: "Does spreading regionalism harm world welfare?" and "Does regionalism help or hinder multilateralism?" This paper synthesizes and critiques the theoretical literature in an attempt to identify the insights that are useful for thinking about regionalism's systemic impact in the new century.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 14056.

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Date of creation: Jun 2008
Publication status: published as in Regional Rules in the Global Trading System. Estevadeordal, Suominen, Teh (Editors) pp 17-95
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:14056
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