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Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade

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  • Raymond Riezman

Abstract

In this paper, a very simple question is asked. Does the fact that trading blocs can form bilateral trade agreements make free trade less likely to occur? The answer is that it depends on the size distribution of the trading blocs. When there is one large trading block along with some smaller ones, then bilateral trade agreements can facilitate the attainment of free trade. If trading blocs are of roughly equivalent size, then bilateral trade agreements allow groups of trading blocs to more effectively monopolize world trade, in which case they may make free trade less likely.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Riezman, 1999. "Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 751-766, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:cje:issued:v:32:y:1999:i:3:p:751-766
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F1 - International Economics - - Trade
    • F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business

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