Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade
There has been growing debate about whether bilateral trade agreements are damaging multilateral efforts to eliminate barriers to international trade. This paper develops a model in which trading blocks always charge optimal tariffs and make trade agreements based on strategic considerations.
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|Date of creation:||1997|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: University of Iowa, Department of Economics, Henry B. Tippie College of Business, Iowa City, Iowa 52242|
Phone: (319) 335-0829
Fax: (319) 335-1956
Web page: http://tippie.uiowa.edu/economics/
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- Haverman, J.D., 1993. "Some Welfare Effects of Dynamic Customs Union Formation," Papers 93-109, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management - Center for International Business Education and Research (CIBER).
- Jon D. Haveman, 1996. "Some Welfare Effects of Sequential Customs Union Formation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 941-58, November.
- Konstantine Gatsios & Larry Karp, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 391-397.
- Frankel, Jeffrey A & Stein, Ernesto & Wei, Shang-Jin, 1996.
"Regional Trading Arrangements: Natural or Supernatural,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 52-56, May.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel & Ernesto Stein & Shang-Jin Wei, 1996. "Regional Trading Arrangement: Natural or Super-Natural?," NBER Working Papers 5431, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel, Ernesto Stein, and Shang-Jin Wei., 1996. "Regional Trading Arrangements: Natural or Super-Natural?," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C96-059, University of California at Berkeley.
- John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013.
"Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions,"
World Scientific Book Chapters,
in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Cole, Harold L. & Obstfeld, Maurice, 1991.
"Commodity trade and international risk sharing : How much do financial markets matter?,"
Journal of Monetary Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 3-24, August.
- Harold L. Cole & Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Commodity Trade and International Risk Sharing: How Much Do Financial Markets Matter?," NBER Working Papers 3027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Richardson, Martin, 1993. "Endogenous protection and trade diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 309-324, May.
- Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
- Carsten Kowalczyk, 1990. "Welfare and Customs Unions," NBER Working Papers 3476, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Lawrence H. Summers, 1991. "Regionalism and the world trading system," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 295-301.
- Kowalczyk, Carsten & Sjostrom, Tomas, 1994.
"Bringing GATT into the Core,"
London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 61(243), pages 301-17, August.
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