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Market access bargaining in the Uruguay Round - Rigid or relaxed reciprocity?

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  • Finger, J. Michael
  • Reincke, Ulrich
  • Castro, Adriana

Abstract

How tightly are trade negotiators held to winning a dollar of concession for each dollar of concession granted? The outcome of the Uruguay Round tariff negotiations suggests that such constraints were not tight. None of the delegations interviewed by the authors had tried to calculate for themselves the extent of concessions"received"And the surplus or deficit of concessions received (over concessions given) varied widely among countries. Measuring the"percentage point dollar"of concessions given and received (a"percentage point dollar"being a reduction of the tariff by one percentage point on $1 of imports, or by trading partners on exports), they found that the outcome of negotiations varied enormously from one country to another. For 13 of 27 countries,"net concessions"(positive or negative) were at least 75 percent of the size of concessions received. Negotiations were widely perceived to involve"equal sacrifice for the common good,"with all countries expected to cut tariffs on the same percentage of imports. Ability to pay was also a consideration: a smaller fraction of imports was liberalized for developing countries. The authors found a tendency toward equality (in percentage of imports affected) across participating countries'concessions, particularly when developing countries'unilateral liberalization was considered - including the part of it that was not bound at the Uruguay Round. Delegations emphasized how important it was for them to look after the interests of politically important sectors (including rice for Japan and the Republic of Korea and textiles for the United States and the European Union).

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, J. Michael & Reincke, Ulrich & Castro, Adriana, 1999. "Market access bargaining in the Uruguay Round - Rigid or relaxed reciprocity?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2258, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Baldwin, Richard, 2008. "Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Baybars Karacaovali & Nuno Limão, 2018. "The clash of liberalizations: Preferential vs. multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Policy Externalities and International Trade Agreements, chapter 14, pages 373-401, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Mayer, Jörg, 2004. "Export Dynamism and Market Access," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 19, pages 289-316.
    4. Karacaovali, Baybars & Limao, Nuno, 2005. "The clash of liberalizations : preferential versus multilateral trade liberalization in the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3493, The World Bank.
    5. Freund, Caroline, 2003. "Reciprocity in free trade agreements," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3061, The World Bank.
    6. Aldy, Joseph E., 2015. "Evaluating Mitigation Effort: Tools and Institutions for Assessing Nationally Determined Contributions," Working Paper Series 15-068, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/6324 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Joseph E. Aldy & William A. Pizer, 2016. "Editor's Choice Alternative Metrics for Comparing Domestic Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture," Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 10(1), pages 3-24.
    9. Aldy, Joseph E. & Pizer, William A., 2014. "Comparability of Effort in International Climate Policy Architecture," Working Paper Series rwp14-006, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Aldy, Joseph Edgar & Pizer, William, 2016. "Alternative Metrics for Comparing Domestic Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture," Scholarly Articles 22808338, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    11. Kiratli, Osman Sabri & Ertan, Sabri Arhan, 2023. "When to Not Respond in Kind? Individuals’ Expectations of the Future and Their Support for Reciprocity in Foreign Policy," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Latest Ar, pages 1-1.
    12. Don Moon, 2006. "Equality and Inequality in the WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) System: Analysis of the GATT/WTO Dispute Data," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 201-228, September.

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