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The ‘Emulator Effect’ Of The Uruguay Round On United States Regionalism

  • Marco Fugazza
  • Frédéric Robert-Nicoud

Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the United States. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the United States grants immediate duty free access (IDA) to its RTA partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the United States grants IDA status especially on goods for which it has cut the multilateral most favoured nation (MFN) tariff during the Uruguay Round the most. Thus, the Uruguay Round (multilateral) “concessions” have emulated subsequent (preferential) trade liberalization. We conclude from this that past liberalization may sow the seeds of future liberalization.

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Paper provided by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in its series UNCTAD Blue Series Papers with number 51.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:unc:blupap:51
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