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Endogenous trade bloc formation in an asymmetric world

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  • Melatos, Mark
  • Woodland, Alan

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  • Melatos, Mark & Woodland, Alan, 2007. "Endogenous trade bloc formation in an asymmetric world," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(4), pages 901-924, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:51:y:2007:i:4:p:901-924
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Demange, Gabrielle & Henriet, Dominique, 1991. "Sustainable oligopolies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, pages 417-428.
    2. Raymond RIEZMAN, 2013. "Customs Unions and the Core," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 3, pages 33-43 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Demange, Gabrielle & Guesnerie, Roger, 1997. "Non-emptiness of the Core: low multi-dimensional decisions spaces and one-dimensional preferences," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 7-17.
    4. Lisandro Abrego & Raymond Riezman & John Whalley, 2013. "How often are propositions on the effects of regional trade agreements theoretical curiosa?," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 9, pages 129-148 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Krueger, Anne O., 1997. "Free trade agreements versus customs unions," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 169-187.
    6. Demange, Gabrielle, 1994. "Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 45-58, January.
    7. Gallaway, Michael P. & McDaniel, Christine A. & Rivera, Sandra A., 2003. "Short-run and long-run industry-level estimates of U.S. Armington elasticities," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, March.
    8. Raymond Riezman, 1999. "Can Bilateral Trade Agreements Help Induce Free Trade," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(3), pages 751-766, May.
    9. Reinert, Kenneth A. & Roland-Holst, David W., 1992. "Armington elasticities for United States manufacturing sectors," Journal of Policy Modeling, Elsevier, vol. 14(5), pages 631-639, October.
    10. Mark Melatos & Alan D. Woodland, 2007. "Pareto-optimal Delegation in Customs Unions," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 441-461, August.
    11. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters,in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    12. Pomfret, Richard, 2001. "The Economics of Regional Trading Arrangements," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199248872.
    13. Jon D. Haveman, 1996. "Some Welfare Effects of Sequential Customs Union Formation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(4), pages 941-958, November.
    14. Bruce A. Blonigen & Wesley W. Wilson, 1999. "Explaining Armington: What Determines Substitutability Between Home and Foreign Goods?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 32(1), pages 1-21, February.
    15. Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1999. "Customs Unions and Comparative Advantage," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 239-266, April.
    16. Richardson, Martin, 1995. "Tariff revenue competition in a free trade area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1429-1437, August.
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    Cited by:

    1. Baldwin, Richard & Jaimovich, Dany, 2012. "Are Free Trade Agreements contagious?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 1-16.
    2. Moise Nken & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2017. "Implications of multilateral tariff bindings on the formation of preferential trade agreements and quest for global free trade," Working Papers 068, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
    3. Facchini, Giovanni & Silva, Peri & Willmann, Gerald, 2013. "The customs union issue: Why do we observe so few of them?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 136-147.
    4. Kamal Saggi & Alan Woodland & Halis Murat Yildiz, 2013. "On the Relationship between Preferential and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: The Case of Customs Unions," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 5(1), pages 63-99, February.
    5. Baldwin, Richard, 2008. "Big-Think Regionalism: a Critical Survey," CEPR Discussion Papers 6874, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Lake, James & Yildiz, Halis M., 2016. "On the different geographic characteristics of Free Trade Agreements and Customs Unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, pages 213-233.
    7. Gabrielle Demange, 2017. "The stability of group formation," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 495-516.
    8. James Lake, 2016. "Why don't more countries form Customs Unions instead of Free Trade Agreements? The role of flexibility," Departmental Working Papers 1601, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics.
    9. repec:smu:ecowpa:1403 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Subhayu Bandyopadhyay & Sajal Lahiri & Howard J. Wall, 2009. "Cross-border lobbying in preferential trading agreements: implications for external tariffs," Working Papers 2009-041, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    11. Giovanni Facchini & Peri Silva & Gerald Willmann, 2015. "The Political Economy of Preferential Trade Arrangements: An Empirical Investigation," Discussion Papers 2015-16, University of Nottingham, GEP.

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