IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

Regionalism versus multilateralism

  • Winters, L. Alan

The author focuses on whether regionalism sets up forces that encourage or discourage evolution toward globally free trade. Although models can be built suggesting either conclusion, these models are still so abstract that they should be viewed as parables rather than sources of testable predictions. This paper presents more conclusions about research strategy than about the world we live in. Among the conclusions reached is that the term multilateralism needs to be defined in every instance. Also, sector-specific lobbies are a danger if regionalism is permitted because they tend to stop blocs from moving all the way to global free trade. While regionalism's direct effect on multilateralism is important, the indirect effect is more because it changes the ways in which groups of countries interact and respond to shocks in the world economy. Furthermore, regionalism, by allowing stronger internalization of the gains from trade liberalization, seems likely to facilitate freer trade when it is initially highly restricted. Lastly, the possibility of regionalism probably increases the risks of catastrophe in the trading system because it essentially coerces trading partners to come to the multilateral negotiating table and regionalism, being motivated by insurance incentives and"shiftable externalities."

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1996/11/01/000009265_3970311114958/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1687.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 30 Nov 1996
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1687
Contact details of provider: Postal:
1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433

Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Collie, David R, 1997. "Bilateralism Is Good: Trade Blocs and Strategic Export Subsidies," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 504-20, October.
  3. Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjostrom, 1993. "Bringing GATT into the Core," NBER Working Papers 4343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Cadot, O. & De Melo, J. & Olarreaga, M., 1996. "Regional Integration and Lobbying for Tariffs Against Non-Members," Research Papers by the Institute of Economics and Econometrics, Geneva School of Economics and Management, University of Geneva 96.08, Institut d'Economie et Econométrie, Université de Genève.
  5. Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1993. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Free Trade Areas," Discussion Papers 1048, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Rodney D. Ludema, 1998. "On the Value of Preferential Trade Agreements in Multilateral Negotiations," International Trade 9802003, EconWPA.
  7. Bond, Eric W. & Syropoulos, Constantinos, 1996. "The size of trading blocs Market power and world welfare effects," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-4), pages 411-437, May.
  8. Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1993. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," Papers 166, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  9. Richard Baldwin, 1993. "A Domino Theory of Regionalism," NBER Working Papers 4465, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  10. André Sapir & Alexis Jacquemin, 1988. "European integration or world integration?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/8242, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  11. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
  12. repec:idb:wpaper:323 is not listed on IDEAS
  13. Bond, E. & Syropoulos, C., 1993. "Trading Blocs and the Sustainability of Inter-Regional Cooperation," Discussion Papers 93-17, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  14. Paul R. Krugman, 1991. "The move toward free trade zones," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 7-58.
  15. Jeffrey A. Frankel & Ernesto Stein & Shang-Jin Wei, 1993. "Continental Trading Blocs: Are They Natural, or Super-Natural?," NBER Working Papers 4588, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  16. Campa, Jose Manuel & Sorenson, Timothy L, 1996. " Are Trade Blocs Conducive to Free Trade?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 98(2), pages 263-73, June.
  17. Kyle Bagwell & Robert Staiger, 1994. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Regional Free Trade Areas," International Trade 9410001, EconWPA.
  18. Antonio Spilimbergo & Ernesto H. Stein, 1996. "The Welfare Implications of Trading Blocs among Countries with Different Endowments," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 6860, Inter-American Development Bank.
  19. repec:fth:geneec:96.07 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Panagariya, Arvind & Findlay, Ronald & DEC, 1994. "A political - economy analysis of free trade areas and customs unions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1261, The World Bank.
  21. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  22. Helpman, Elhanan, 1995. "Politics and Trade Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 1269, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  23. Sinclair, P. & Vines, D., 1995. "Bigger Trade Blocs Need Not Entail More Protection," Discussion Papers 95-32, Department of Economics, University of Birmingham.
  24. Desruelle, Dominique & Richardson, Martin, 1997. "Fortress Europe: Jericho or Chateau d'If?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 5(1), pages 32-46, February.
  25. Levy, Philip I, 1997. "A Political-Economic Analysis of Free-Trade Agreements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 506-19, September.
  26. Gatsios, Konstantine & Karp, Larry, 1995. "Delegation in a general equilibrium model of customs unions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 319-333, February.
  27. Frankel, Jeffrey & Stein, Ernesto & Wei, Shang-jin, 1995. "Trading blocs and the Americas: The natural, the unnatural, and the super-natural," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 61-95, June.
  28. Riezman, Raymond, 1985. "Customs unions and the core," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 355-365, November.
  29. Nitsch, Volker, 1996. "Do Three Trade Blocs Minimize World Welfare?," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 4(3), pages 355-63, October.
  30. Levy, Philip I., 1999. "Lobbying and international cooperation in tariff setting," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 345-370, April.
  31. Carlo Perroni & John Whalley, 2000. "The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 1-24, February.
  32. repec:fth:michin:298 is not listed on IDEAS
  33. Junichi Goto & Koichi Hamada, 1995. "EU, NAFTA, and Asian Responses: A Perspective from the Calculus of Participation," NBER Working Papers 5325, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  34. Richardson, Martin, 1993. "Endogenous protection and trade diversion," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(3-4), pages 309-324, May.
  35. Wilfred J. Ethier, 1998. "Regionalism in a Multilateral World," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1214-1245, December.
  36. Konstantine Gatsios & Larry Karp, 1991. "Delegation Games in Customs Unions," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 58(2), pages 391-397.
  37. Jackson, J.H., 1991. "The European Community and World Trade: The Commercial Policy Dimension," Working Papers 298, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  38. Widgren, Mika, 1995. " Probabilistic Voting Power in the EU Council: The Cases of Trade Policy and Social Regulation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 97(2), pages 345-56, June.
  39. Winters, L. Alan, 1994. "The EC and protection: The political economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(3-4), pages 596-603, April.
  40. Richardson, Martin, 1995. "Tariff revenue competition in a free trade area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1429-1437, August.
  41. Lawrence H. Summers, 1991. "Regionalism and the world trading system," Proceedings - Economic Policy Symposium - Jackson Hole, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pages 295-301.
  42. Winters,L. Alan & Venables,Anthony (ed.), 1993. "European Integration," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521435277, Junio.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1687. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.