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Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements "How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?"

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  • M. Ayhan Kose
  • Raymond Riezman

Abstract

This paper examines the welfare implications of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) from the perspective of small countries in the context of a multi-country, general equilibrium model. We calibrate our model to represent one relatively small country and two symmetric big countries. We consider two cases. In one case, the small country is an 'innocent bystander', that is, it is left out of a PTA between the two large countries. In the second case, the small country signs a PTA with one of the large countries. We simulate the model and calculate consumption allocations, prices, t rade volume, and tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: Free Trade (FT), Free Trade Area (FTA), and Customs Union (CU). We find that free trade is the best outcome for the small country. If the large country PTA takes the for m of a CU then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is very large. If it is a FTA then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is relatively modest. In fact, the small country prefers to be an 'innocent bystander' to being a member of a FTA with one of the large countries.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Ayhan Kose & Raymond Riezman, 2000. "Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements "How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?"," CESifo Working Paper Series 253, CESifo.
  • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_253
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    File URL: https://www.cesifo.org/DocDL/WP253.PDF
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. M. Ayhan Kose & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Understanding the Welfare Implications of Preferential Trade Agreements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 7, pages 85-99, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Raymond Riezman (ed.), International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 5, pages 53-66, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
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    Cited by:

    1. Oksana Harbuzyuk & Stefan Lutz, 2008. "Analyzing trade opening in Ukraine: effects of a customs union with the EU," Economic Change and Restructuring, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 221-238, September.

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