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Free Trade, Customs Unions, and Transfers

  • Hideo Konishi

    ()

    (Boston College)

  • Carsten Kowalczyk

    (Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University)

  • Tomas Sjostrom

    (Pennsylvania State University)

All countries would agree to immediate global free trade if countries were compensated for any terms-of-trade losses with transfers from countries whose terms-of-trade improve, and if customs unions were required to have no effects on non-member countries. Global free trade with transfers is in the core of a Kemp-Wan-Grinols customs union game.

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Paper provided by Boston College Department of Economics in its series Boston College Working Papers in Economics with number 568.

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Date of creation: 24 Jul 2003
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Handle: RePEc:boc:bocoec:568
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  1. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 2013. "Do Big Countries Win Tariff Wars?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: International Trade Agreements and Political Economy, chapter 4, pages 45-51 World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
  2. Bagwell, K. & Staiger, R.W., 1994. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation During the Formation of Customs Unions," Working papers 9404, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  3. Carsten Kowalczyk & Donald Davis, 1996. "Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA," NBER Working Papers 5421, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "The Politics of Free Trade Agreements," CEPR Discussion Papers 908, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. John Kennan & Raymond Riezman, 1990. "Optimal Tariff Equilibria with Customs Unions," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 23(1), pages 70-83, February.
  6. Grandmont, J. M. & McFadden, D., 1972. "A technical note on classical gains from trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 109-125, May.
  7. Kemp, Murray C. & Wan, Henry Jr., 1976. "An elementary proposition concerning the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 95-97, February.
  8. Carsten Kowalczyk & Ronald J. Wonnacott, 1992. "Hubs and Spokes, and Free Trade in the Americas," NBER Working Papers 4198, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Hideo Konishi & Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjöström, 2008. "Global Free Trade is in the Core of a Customs Union Game," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 685, Boston College Department of Economics.
  10. Jones, Ronald W, 1969. "Tariffs and Trade in General Equilibrium: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 418-24, June.
  11. Carsten Kowalczyk & Tomas Sjostrom, 1993. "Bringing GATT into the Core," NBER Working Papers 4343, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Kowalczyk, Carsten & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2000. "Trade as transfers, GATT and the core," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 163-169, February.
  13. Wilfred J. Ethier, 2004. "Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 12(3), pages 303-320, 08.
  14. Grinols, Earl L., 1981. "An extension of the Kemp-Wan theorem on the formation of customs unions," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 259-266, May.
  15. Earl L. Grinols & Kar-yiu Wong, 1991. "An Exact Measure of Welfare Change," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 24(2), pages 428-49, May.
  16. Richard Chisik, 2010. "Gradualism in Free Trade Agreements: A Theoretical Justification," Working Papers 018, Ryerson University, Department of Economics.
  17. repec:uwo:uwowop:9209 is not listed on IDEAS
  18. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1997. "Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of Free Trade Areas," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 38(2), pages 291-319, May.
  19. Kowalczyk, Carsten, 2000. "Welfare and Integration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(2), pages 483-94, May.
  20. Riezman, Raymond, 1985. "Customs unions and the core," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 355-365, November.
  21. Wonnacott, Paul & Wonnacott, Ronald, 1981. "Is Unilateral Tariff Reduction Preferable to a Customs Union? The Curious Case of the Missing Foreign Tariffs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(4), pages 704-14, September.
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