The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonisation of Trade and Industrial Policy
Partial cooperation in setting trade and industrial policies may not benefit members of a customs union if exporters outside the union react aggressively. Even if the union comprises the entire noncompetitive sector of industry, cooperation on trade policy may be disadvantageous if industrial policy (e.g., investment subsidies) are chosen noncooperatively; cooperation in trade policy may exacerbate the inefficiencies created by noncooperation in investment. Cooperation in choosing trade policies may also encourage investment by competitive importers and, thus, reduce the demand faced by the oligopolists; this may more than offset the ex post benefits of cooperation. Copyright 1992 by Royal Economic Society.
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Volume (Year): 102 (1992)
Issue (Month): 410 (January)
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