Monopoly Power Can Be Disadvantageous in the Extraction of a Durable Nonrenewable Resource
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- Karp, Larry, 1995. "Monopoly Power can be Disadvantageous in the Extraction of a Durable Nonrenewable Resource," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt4cs0m1vb, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Karp, L., 1992. "Monopoly power can be disadvantageous in the extraction of a durable nonrenewable resource," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 9209, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
References listed on IDEAS
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Marín-Solano, Jesús, 2015. "Group inefficiency in a common property resource game with asymmetric players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 214-217.
- Driskill, Robert, 2006. "Multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models: A critical review," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 171-210, January.
- Laussel, Didier & Van Long, Ngo & Resende, Joana, 2015.
"Network effects, aftermarkets and the Coase conjecture: A dynamic Markovian approach,"
International Journal of Industrial Organization,
Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 84-96.
- Didier LAUSSEL & Ngo Van LONG & Joana RESENDE, 2014. "Network Effects, Aftermarkets and the Coase Conjecture : A Dynamic Markovian Approach," Cahiers de recherche 06-2014, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Didier Laussel & Ngo Van Long & Joana Resende, 2015. "Network effects, aftermarkets and the Coase conjecture: A dynamic Markovian approach," Post-Print hal-01457339, HAL.
- Larry Karp & Thierry Paul, 2005.
"Intersectoral Adjustment and Policy Intervention: the Importance of General-Equilibrium Effects,"
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- Karp, Larry & Paul, Thierry, 2002. "Intersectoral Adjustment and Policy Intervention: the Importance of General Equilibrium Effects," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt7rk3z9w1, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Luca Bossi & Vladimir Petkov, 2007. "Habits, Market Power, and Policy Selection," Working Papers 0702, University of Miami, Department of Economics.
- Driskill, Robert, 2001. "Durable goods oligopoly," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 19(3-4), pages 391-413, March.
- Gregory Goering & Michael Pippenger, 2002. "Durable Goods Monopoly and Forward Markets," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 271-282.
- Timothy Swanson & Ben Groom, 2012. "Regulating Biodiversity: What is the Problem?," CIES Research Paper series 08-2012, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
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