The Cartelization of World Commodity Markets
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- Thomas, J, 1992. "Cartel Stability in an Exhaustible Resource Model," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(235), pages 279-293, August.
- Juan-Pablo Montero & Juan Ignacio Guzman, 2010. "OUTPUT-EXPANDING COLLUSION IN THE PRESENCE OF A COMPETITIVE FRINGE -super-," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 58(1), pages 106-126, March.
- Jesper Fredborg Hurić-Larsen & Angela Münch, 2016. "Competition and Environmental Policy in the EU: Old Foes, New Friends?," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 16(2), pages 137-153, June.
- W. Welch, 1981. "Money and votes: A simultaneous equation model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 36(2), pages 209-234, January.
- Benchekroun, Hassan & Gaudet, Gerard & Van Long, Ngo, 2006.
"Temporary natural resource cartels,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 663-674, November.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 2004-02, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- BENCHEKROUN, Hassan & GAUDET, Gérard & LONG, Ngo Van, 2004. "Temporary Natural Resource Cartels," Cahiers de recherche 03-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Ngo Long, 2015. "Dynamic Games Between Firms and Infinitely Lived Consumers: A Review of the Literature," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 467-492, December.
- Siebert, Horst, 1987. "Entwicklungstendenzen der Weltwirtschaft: Stilisierte Fakten und Ansätze zur Erklärung," Open Access Publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy 1347, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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