Anarchy, Uncertainty, And The Emergence Of Property Rights
This paper investigates whether Lockean first claimer property rights should be expected to emerge in anarchy. Individuals behind a veil of uncertainty about their future wealth decide independently whether to commit to using fcrce. Neither the contractarian hypothesis that a thicker veil of uncertainty supports more co-operation nor Demsetz's hypothesis that well-defined property rights emerge as the value of the externality from not having private property increases is unambiguously implied by the model. Copyright 1993 Blackwell Publishers Ltd..
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Volume (Year): 5 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (03)
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