Bargaining power in repeated games
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- Douglas Bernheim, B. & Ray, Debraj, 1989. "Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 295-326, December.
- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987.
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- Abrea Dilip & Pearce David & Stacchetti Ennio, 1993. "Renegotiation and Symmetry in Repeated Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 217-240, August.
- Joel Watson, 1999.
"Starting Small and Commitment,"
Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers
1217, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Commitment," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series qt37p340fc, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
- Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-96, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987.
"On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games,"
467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
- Asheim, Geir B., 1991.
"Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 3(3), pages 278-294, August.
- Asheim, G.B., 1988. "Extending Renegotiation-Proofness To Infinite Horizon Games," Papers 16-88, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
- MacLeod, B.W. & Bergin, J., 1991.
"Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games,"
Cahiers de recherche
9118, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- James Bergin & Bentley MacLeod, 1989. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Working Papers 752, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bergin, J. & Macleod, B., 1989. "Eficiency And Renegotiation In Repeated Games," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 121-89, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- MacLeod, B.W. & Bergin, J., 1991. "Efficiency and Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Cahiers de recherche 9118, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
- David G. Pearce, 1987. "Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 855, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Ray Debraj, 1994. "Internally Renegotiation-Proof Equilibrium Sets: Limit Behavior with Low Discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 162-177, January.
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