Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade
This paper examines how pharmaceutical firms have responded to changes in intellectual property rights and trade barriers that legalized "parallel imports" within the European Union. The threat of arbitrage by parallel traders reduces the ability of firms to price discriminate across countries. Due to regulations on price and antitrust law on rationing supply, pharmaceutical firms may rely on non-price responses. Such responses include differentiation of products across countries and selective "culling" of product lines to reduce arbitrage opportunities, as well as raising arbitrageurs' costs through choice of packaging. Using a dataset of drug prices and sales from 1993-2004 covering 30 countries, I find evidence that the behavior of pharmaceutical firms in the EU with respect to their product portfolios is consistent with attempts to reduce parallel trade. This may at least partially explain why parallel trade has not yet resulted in significant price convergence across EU countries. Accounting for non-price strategic responses may therefore be important in assessing the welfare effects of parallel imports.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Kyle, Margaret (2011) "Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy: Vol. 11: Iss. 2 (Advances), Article 2.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- ANDERSON, Simon P. & GINSBURGH, Victor A., .
"International pricing with costly consumer arbitrage,"
CORE Discussion Papers RP
-1373, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Anderson, Simon P & Ginsburgh, Victor A, 1999. "International Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 7(1), pages 126-39, February.
- Varian, Hal R, 1985. "Price Discrimination and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 870-75, September.
- Margaret K. Kyle, 2007. "Pharmaceutical Price Controls and Entry Strategies," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 89(1), pages 88-99, February.
- Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Frank Verboven, 2001.
"Market Integration and Convergence to the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market,"
NBER Working Papers
8402, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Goldberg, Pinelopi K. & Verboven, Frank, 2005. "Market integration and convergence to the Law of One Price: evidence from the European car market," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 49-73, January.
- Goldberg, Pinelopi & Verboven, Frank, 2001. "Market Integration and Convergence to the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market," CEPR Discussion Papers 2926, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Tommaso Valletti & Stefan Szymanski, 2006.
"Parallel Trade, International Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: A Welfare Analysis,"
CEIS Research Paper
75, Tor Vergata University, CEIS.
- Szymanski, Stefan & Valletti, Tommaso, 2005. "Parallel Trade, International Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: A Welfare Analysis," CEPR Discussion Papers 5022, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Michael J. Mazzeo, 2002. "Product Choice and Oligopoly Market Structure," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 33(2), pages 221-242, Summer.
- Leemore S. Dafny, 2005. "Games Hospitals Play: Entry Deterrence in Hospital Procedure Markets," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(3), pages 513-542, 09.
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2001.
"Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union,"
Working Paper Series
546, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
- Ganslandt, Mattias & Maskus, Keith E., 2001. "Parallel imports of pharmaceutical products in the European Union," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2630, The World Bank.
- Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, 2005.
"How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines,"
NBER Working Papers
11072, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, 2008. "How do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 123(4), pages 1611-1633, November.
- Austan Goolsbee & Chad Syverson, 2004. "How Do Incumbents Respond to the Threat of Entry? Evidence from the Major Airlines," Working Papers 04-04, NET Institute, revised Dec 2004.
- Danzon, Patricia M. & Chao, Li-Wei, 2000. "Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and why?," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 159-195, March.
- Fiona M. Scott Morton, 1997. "The Strategic Response by Pharmaceutical Firms to the Medicaid Most-Favored-Customer Rules," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm58, Yale School of Management.
- Malueg, D.A. & Schwartz, M., 1993.
"Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion and International Price Discrimination,"
93-6, U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division.
- Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
- Mark Duggan & Fiona Scott Morton, 2004. "The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing," NBER Working Papers 10930, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Parallel Imports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(9), pages 1269-1284, 09.
- Stefan Szymanski & Tommaso Valletti, 2005. "Parallel trade, price discrimination, investment and price caps," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 20(44), pages 705-749, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12968. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.