Trade, Intellectual Property Rights, and the World Trade Organization

This paper surveys the literature on international trade and the protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the global economy. The discussion is organized around the major questions in the field. How does openness to trade affect national incentives for patent protection? What is the rationale for international coordination over patent policies? Given that countries are highly asymmetric with respect to their technological capabilities, what incentives do lagging countries have for enforcing IPRs and what are the consequences of requiring them to do so? To what extent do empirical studies support the major arguments for and against the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)? Finally, can the structure of TRIPS -- both in terms of the core obligations it imposes on WTO members and the flexibilities that it provides them with respect to exhaustion policies and the use of compulsory licensing -- be reconciled with existing models of IPR protection in the global economy?