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Compulsory Licensing - Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act

  • Petra Moser
  • Alessandra Voena

Compulsory licensing allows firms in developing countries to produce foreign-owned inventions without the consent of foreign patent owners. This paper uses an exogenous event of compulsory licensing after World War I under the Trading with the Enemy Act to examine the long run effects of compulsory licensing on domestic invention. Difference-in-differences analyses of nearly 200,000 chemical inventions suggest that compulsory licensing increased domestic invention by at least 20 percent.

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File URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w15598.pdf
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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15598.

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Date of creation: Dec 2009
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Publication status: published as Petra Moser & Alessandra Voena, 2012. "Compulsory Licensing: Evidence from the Trading with the Enemy Act," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(1), pages 396-427, February.
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15598
Note: DAE LE PR
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