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International Protection of Intellectual Property

  • Gene M. Grossman
  • Edwin L.-C. Lai

We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country’s patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 790.

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Date of creation: 2002
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_790
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  1. McCalman, P., 1999. "Reaping What You Sow: An Empirical Analysis of International Patent Harmonization," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 1999-374, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
  2. Suzanne Scotchmer, 2002. "The Political Economy of Intellectual Property Treaties," NBER Working Papers 9114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Grossman, Gene & Lai, Edwin, 2002. "International Protection of Intellectual Property," CEPR Discussion Papers 3118, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Parallel Imports," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(9), pages 1269-1284, 09.
  5. Chin, J.C. & Grossman, G.M., 1988. "Intellectual Property Rigths And North-South Trade," Papers 143, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.
  6. Lai, Edwin L. -C. & Qiu, Larry D., 2003. "The North's intellectual property rights standard for the South?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 183-209, January.
  7. Phillip McCalman, 2001. "National patents, innovation and international agreements," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(1), pages 1-14.
  8. Keith E. Maskus, 1993. "Intellectual property rights and the Uruguay Round," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, issue Q I, pages 10-25.
  9. Helpman, E., 1992. "Innovation, Imitation and intellectual Property Rights," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1597, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
  10. Mayer, Wolfgang, 1981. "Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 135-53, March.
  11. Ginarte, Juan C. & Park, Walter G., 1997. "Determinants of patent rights: A cross-national study," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 283-301, October.
  12. Keith E. Maskus, 2000. "Intellectual Property Rights in the Global Economy," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 99, December.
  13. Deardorff, Alan V, 1992. "Welfare Effects of Global Patent Protection," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 59(233), pages 35-51, February.
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