IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/inecon/v56y2002i1p233-245.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports

Author

Listed:
  • Richardson, Martin

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that, when countries individually choose whether or not to prohibit parallel imports, a global Nash equilibrium involves the permitting of parallel importing into all relevant foreign markets i.e. global uniform pricing. This result is sensitive in a straightforward way to the tariff-setting powers of countries and to the specification of a government’s objective function (i.e. political economy considerations). We also show that when countries can prevent “parallel exports” then any Nash equilibrium involves global price discrimination.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Richardson, Martin, 2002. "An elementary proposition concerning parallel imports," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 233-245, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:56:y:2002:i:1:p:233-245
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022-1996(01)00110-6
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    2. Malueg, David A. & Schwartz, Marius, 1994. "Parallel imports, demand dispersion, and international price discrimination," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3-4), pages 167-195, November.
    3. Gallini, Nancy T. & Hollis, Aidan, 1999. "A contractual approach to the gray market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, March.
    4. Hideo Konishi & Kamal Saggi & Shlomo Weber, 2023. "Endogenous trade policy under foreign direct investment," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Kamal Saggi (ed.), Technology Transfer, Foreign Direct Investment, and the Protection of Intellectual Property in the Global Economy, chapter 23, pages 523-542, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Postlep, Rolf-Dieter & Wagner, Gert G., 1998. "Zur Ökonomik grundfinanzierter wirtschafts- und sozialwissenschaftlicher Forschung," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 217(3), pages 346-358.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Daniel Knox & Martin Richardson, 2017. "Trade Policy and Parallel Imports," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Dimensions of Trade Policy, chapter 15, pages 301-325, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Kim, Young-Han & Kim, Sang-Kee, 2012. "Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 614-620.
    3. Braouezec, Yann, 2012. "Customer-class pricing, parallel trade and the optimal number of market segments," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 605-614.
    4. Frank Müller-Langer, 2009. "Does Parallel Trade Freedom Harm Consumers in Small Markets?," Croatian Economic Survey, The Institute of Economics, Zagreb, vol. 11(1), pages 11-41, April.
    5. K. C. Fung & Chelsea C. Lin & Ray‐Yun Chang, 2009. "The Political Economy of Strategic Trade Policies," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 494-509, August.
    6. Frank Mueller-Langer, 2014. "Copyright and parallel trade," Chapters, in: Richard Watt (ed.), Handbook on the Economics of Copyright, chapter 16, pages 287-310, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Blanchard, Emily J., 2010. "Reevaluating the role of trade agreements: Does investment globalization make the WTO obsolete?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(1), pages 63-72, September.
    8. Nikolaos Zevgolis & Panagiotis Fotis, 2014. "Prohibition of parallel imports as a vertical restraint: per se approach or a misunderstanding?," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 38(2), pages 317-342, October.
    9. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    10. Grether, Jean-Marie & de Melo, Jaime & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2001. "Who determines Mexican trade policy?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 343-370, April.
    11. Raff, Horst & Schmitt, Nicolas, 2007. "Why parallel trade may raise producers' profits," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 434-447, April.
    12. Kim, JunYun & Magee, Stephen & Lee, Hongshik, 2023. "Capitalization of the economy and labor return: How does lobbying affect resource allocation?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 120(C).
    13. Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Foreign-owned Capital and Endogenous Tariffs," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 14, pages 606-624.
    14. Cai, Dapeng & Jørgensen, Jan Guldager, 2017. "Mutual Recognition for Sale: International Bargaining over Product Standards," Discussion Papers on Economics 1/2017, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    15. Teodora Cosac, 2004. "Vertical Restraints and Parallel Imports with Differentiated Products," Industrial Organization 0401006, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    16. Masahiro Endoh, 2012. "Cross-border political donations and Pareto-efficient tariffs," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(4), pages 493-512, July.
    17. Polk, Andreas & Schmutzler, Armin & Müller, Adrian, 2014. "Lobbying and the power of multinational firms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 36(C), pages 209-227.
    18. Andréa M. Maechler, 2000. "The Politics of Trade Liberalization in the Presence of FDI Incentives," Working Papers 00.09, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    19. Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2010. "An analysis of the ambiguous welfare effects of parallel trade freedom," MPRA Paper 35704, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    20. Bennato, Anna Rita & Valletti, Tommaso, 2014. "Pharmaceutical innovation and parallel trade," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 83-92.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:inecon:v:56:y:2002:i:1:p:233-245. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505552 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.