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Tariff barriers and the protection of intellectual property in the global economy

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  • Geng, Difei
  • Saggi, Kamal

Abstract

This paper develops a simple two-country model of quality-improving innovation to study the role tariff barriers play in shaping the welfare impact of global patent protection. We show that international patent policy coordination via national treatment is desirable only if tariff barriers between countries are sufficiently low. Furthermore, if countries are free to impose their optimal tariffs on one another, requiring national treatment in patent protection unambiguously lowers world welfare. Hence, constraining tariffs helps pave the way for international coordination over patent protection. This insight provides a potential rationale for the historical sequencing of policy reforms observed in the global trading system: multilateral rules on intellectual property were adopted only after decades of trade negotiations had succeeded in substantially reducing global tariffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Geng, Difei & Saggi, Kamal, 2022. "Tariff barriers and the protection of intellectual property in the global economy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 144(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:144:y:2022:i:c:s0014292122000228
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104074
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International patent protection; Import tariffs; National treatment; R&D; Welfare;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F23 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - Multinational Firms; International Business

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