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Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion

  • Henry Tulkens

    (Center for operations research and econometrics (CORE))

  • Parkash Chander

    (National University of Singapore)

In essence, any international environmental agreement (IEA) implies cooperation of a form or another. The paper seeks for logical foundations of this. It first deals with how the need for cooperation derives from the public good aspect of the externalities involved, as well as with where the source of cooperation lies in cooperative game theory. In either case, the quest for efficiency is claimed to be at the root of cooperation. Next, cooperation is considered from the point of view of stability. After recalling the two competing concepts of stability in use in the IEA literature, new insights on the nature of the gamma core in general are given as well as of the Chander-Tulkens solution within the gamma core. Free riding is also evaluated in relation with the alternative forms of stability under scrutiny. Finally, it is asked whether with the often mentioned virtue of “self enforcement” any conceptual gain is achieved, different from what is meant by efficiency and stability. A skeptical answer is offered, as a reply to Barrett’s (2003) attempt at giving the notion a specific content.

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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number 2006.34.

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Date of creation: Feb 2006
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Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2006.34
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  1. DREZE, Jacques H. & de LA VALLEE POUSSIN, Dominique, . "A tâtonnement process for public goods," CORE Discussion Papers RP -83, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  3. VAN STEENBERGHE, Vincent, 2004. "Core-stable and equitable allocations of greenhouse gas emission permits," CORE Discussion Papers 2004075, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Parkash Chander, 2003. "The ?-Core and Coalition Formation," Working Papers 2003.94, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
  6. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
  7. Eyckmans, Johan & Finus, Michael, 2009. "An Almost Ideal Sharing Scheme for Coalition Games with Externalities," Stirling Economics Discussion Papers 2009-10, University of Stirling, Division of Economics.
  8. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens & Jean-Pascal van Ypersele & Stephane Willems, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: An Economic and Game Theoretic Interpretation," CESifo Working Paper Series 229, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-94, Supplemen.
  10. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003. "Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February.
  11. TULKENS, Henry & SCHOUMAKER, Françoise, . "Stability analysis of an effluent charge and the 'polluters pay' principle," CORE Discussion Papers RP -224, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  12. ROBERTS, John, . "Incentives in planning procedures for the provision of public goods," CORE Discussion Papers RP -371, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  13. Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2007. "Measures to enhance the success of global climate treaties," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 73-97, March.
  14. Champsaur, Paul & Laroque, Guy, 1982. "Strategic Behavior in Decentralized Planning Procedures," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 325-44, March.
  15. Carlo Carraro & Barbara Buchner, 2006. "Regional and sub-global climate blocs. A game-theoretic perspective on bottom-up climate regimes," Working Papers 2006_10, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  16. Oran R. Young, 2003. "Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Global Environmental Politics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 145-147, 02.
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