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Cooperation is essential for 2 centigrade degrees Target: a new perspective from the Dynamic Game Model

Author

Listed:
  • Jin Zhugang

    () (School of Environment, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China and Center for Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China)

  • Can Wang

    (School of Environment, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China and Center for Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China)

  • Wenjia Cai

    (Center for Earth System Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China)

Abstract

A theoretical country-level dynamic game model involving both the particularity of climate change investment and individual's subjective initiatives is put forward. Positive, negative, spillover effects of climate change investment and the individual's dynamic strategies are distinguished and involved into the theoretical model. With numerical simulation and sensitivity analyses, the essentiality of cooperation for 2C target is then proved. The lack of self-driven force for cooperation in climate negotiation is further explained from the perspective of game theory. In addition, the feasibilities to realize generalized Pareto improvement with effective compensation and benefit transfer mechanisms are also confirmed.

Suggested Citation

  • Jin Zhugang & Can Wang & Wenjia Cai, 2013. "Cooperation is essential for 2 centigrade degrees Target: a new perspective from the Dynamic Game Model," Review of Applied Socio-Economic Research, Pro Global Science Association, vol. 5(1), pages 100-105, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:rse:wpaper:v:5:y:2013:i:1:p:100-105
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    File URL: http://reaser.eu/RePec/rse/wpaper/R5_11_ZhugangJin_p100_105.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
    2. Melissa Dell & Benjamin F. Jones & Benjamin A. Olken, 2009. "Temperature and Income: Reconciling New Cross-Sectional and Panel Estimates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 198-204, May.
    3. Pindyck, Robert S., 2012. "Uncertain outcomes and climate change policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 289-303.
    4. Peter Wood, 2010. "Climate Change and Game Theory," Environmental Economics Research Hub Research Reports 1062, Environmental Economics Research Hub, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    climate change negotiation; Game model; Cooperation; 2 centigrade degrees;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General

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