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A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

Author

Listed:
  • Dritan Osmani
  • Richard S.J. Tol

    () (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland)

Abstract

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.

Suggested Citation

  • Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions," Working Papers FNU-150, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
  • Handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:150
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Henry, TULKENS & Parkash, CHANDER, 2006. "Cooperation, stability and self-enforcement in interational environmental agreements : a conceptual discussion," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006003, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques, revised 15 Jan 2006.
    2. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
    3. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
    4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, "undated". "International Environmental Agreements -The Role of Foresight," Economics Working Papers 2002-10, Department of Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus University.
    5. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal transfers and participation decisions in international environmental agreements," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(4), pages 379-396, December.
    6. Yuan Ju & Peter Borm & Pieter Ruys, 2007. "The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 28(4), pages 685-703, June.
    7. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
    8. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 1995. "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 2(2), pages 279-293, August.
    9. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    10. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2009. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 455-492, June.
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    13. Tol, Richard S. J., 2001. "Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 71-85, January.
    14. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
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    Cited by:

    1. Dritan Osmani, "undated". "A note on optimal transfer schemes, stable coalition for environmental protection and joint maximization assumption," Working Papers FNU-176, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    game theory; coalition formation; joint welfare maximization; Shapley value; Nash bargaining solution; Consensus Value; international environmental agreements;

    JEL classification:

    • C02 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General - - - Mathematical Economics
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods

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