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A short note on joint welfare maximization assumptions

  • Dritan Osmani
  • Richard S.J. Tol

    ()

    (Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland)

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of international environmental agreements (IEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximize their joint welfare. The joint maxi- mization assumption is compared with di®erent sharing pro¯t schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and Consensus Value. The results show that the joint welfare max- imization assumption is similar with Nash Bargaining solution.

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File URL: http://www.fnu.zmaw.de/fileadmin/fnu-files/publication/working-papers/Osmani_Tol_FNU--150.pdf
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Paper provided by Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University in its series Working Papers with number FNU-150.

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Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision: Oct 2007
Handle: RePEc:sgc:wpaper:150
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  1. Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994. "The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities," Working Papers 886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  2. Tol, Richard S. J., 2001. "Equitable cost-benefit analysis of climate change policies," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 71-85, January.
  3. Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1158, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2015. "International Environmental Agreements-The Role of Foresight," Discussion Paper Series 2015_09, Department of Economics, University of Macedonia, revised Dec 2015.
  5. Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 2006. "Cooperation, Stability and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements: A Conceptual Discussion," Working Papers 2006.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  6. Carlo Carraro & Johan Eyckmans & Michael Finus, 2006. "Optimal Transfers and Participation Decisions in International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 2006_44, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
  7. Ioannidis, Alexis & Papandreou, Andreas & Sartzetakis, Eftichios, 2000. "International Environmental Agreements: a Literature Review," Cahiers de recherche 0008, GREEN.
  8. Asheim, Geir B. & Froyn, Camilla Bretteville & Hovi, Jon & Menz, Fredric C., 2006. "Regional versus global cooperation for climate control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 93-109, January.
  9. Johan Eyckmans, 2001. "On the farsighted stability of the Kyoto Protocol," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0103, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
  10. Ju, Y. & Borm, P.E.M. & Ruys, P.H.M., 2004. "The Consensus Value : A New Solution Concept for Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper 2004-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  11. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2001. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Working Papers 04001, Concordia University, Department of Economics, revised Feb 2003.
  12. Osmani, Dritan & Tol, Richard, 2006. "The case of two self-enforcing international agreements for environmental protection," MPRA Paper 4256, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  13. d'ASPREMONT, Claude & JACQUEMIN, Alexis & GABSZEWICZ, Jean J. & WEYMARK, John A., . "On the stability of collusive price leadership," CORE Discussion Papers RP 522, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  14. Dritan Osmani & Richard Tol, 2009. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 455-492, 06.
  15. Dritan Osmani & Richard S.J. Tol, 2007. "Toward Farsightedly Stable International Environmental Agreements, Part two," Working Papers FNU-149, Research unit Sustainability and Global Change, Hamburg University, revised Oct 2007.
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