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Strategic Interaction Across Countries and Multinational Agglomeration: An Application to the Cement Industry

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  • Pankaj Ghemawat

    (IESE Business School, 08034 Barcelona, Spain)

  • Catherine Thomas

    (Columbia Business School, New York, New York 10027)

Abstract

Agglomeration in foreign direct investment (FDI) is typically attributed to location-specific characteristics such as natural resource advantages or production-related spillovers between multinational firms. The increasing collocation of the largest global firms in the cement industry since the 1980s is not easily attributed to either of these explanations. This paper draws on theories of multimarket contact to test whether strategic interaction across national markets has influenced the successive market entry decisions generating the observed agglomeration. We first establish that there is indeed nonrandom agglomeration of the six largest cement firms. We next show that preexisting cross-market interaction with current incumbents helps predict which firm will enter a given market and also the choice of market a given firm enters. The association does not appear to be caused by strategic convergence or mimicry of recent entry events and cannot be explained by production side effects, which depend only on local conditions. The findings are consistent with multimarket contact models where collocation allows firms to sustain higher prices in all markets. This latter inference is also supported by evidence of an association between global firm market share and local cement price. The paper suggests that pricing spillovers can serve as an alternative motivation for FDI agglomeration.

Suggested Citation

  • Pankaj Ghemawat & Catherine Thomas, 2008. "Strategic Interaction Across Countries and Multinational Agglomeration: An Application to the Cement Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 54(12), pages 1980-1996, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:inm:ormnsc:v:54:y:2008:i:12:p:1980-1996
    DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.1080.0917
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Leone, Fabrizio & Macchiavello, Rocco & Reed, Tristan, 2022. "Market size, markups and international price dispersion in the cement industry," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 117954, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Carnevale, Marina & Nachum, Lilac & Korn, Helaine, 2017. "Why does MNE performance vary across countries?," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1196-1207.
    3. Özgecan Koçak & Serden Özcan, 2013. "How Does Rivals' Presence Affect Firms' Decision to Enter New Markets? Economic and Sociological Explanations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(11), pages 2586-2603, November.
    4. Elisabetta Allevi & Giorgia Oggioni & Rossana Riccardi & Marco Rocco, 2013. "A spatial competitive analysis: the carbon leakage effect on the cement industry under the European Emissions Trading Scheme," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 899, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    5. Juan Alcácer & Cristian Dezső & Minyuan Zhao, 2015. "Location choices under strategic interactions," Strategic Management Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 197-215, February.
    6. Minyoung Kim & Chang Hoon Oh & Jukyeong Han, 2024. "Colocation as network: Types and performance implications of structural positions in colocation network," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 55(1), pages 71-90, February.
    7. Shivaram V. Devarakonda & Brian T. McCann & Jeffrey J. Reuer, 2018. "Marshallian Forces and Governance Externalities: Location Effects on Contractual Safeguards in Research and Development Alliances," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 29(6), pages 1112-1129, December.
    8. Denise R. Dunlap & Roberto S. Santos, 2021. "Storming the Beachhead: An Examination of Developed and Emerging Market Multinational Strategic Location Decisions in the U.S," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(7), pages 1-15, July.
    9. Marius Chofor Asaba & Fabian Duffner & Florian Frieden & Jens Leker & Stephan von Delft, 2022. "Location choice for large‐scale battery manufacturing plants: Exploring the role of clean energy, costs, and knowledge on location decisions in Europe," Journal of Industrial Ecology, Yale University, vol. 26(4), pages 1514-1527, August.
    10. Guy Meunier & Jean‐Pierre Ponssard & Catherine Thomas, 2016. "Capacity Investment under Demand Uncertainty: The Role of Imports in the U.S. Cement Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 455-486, April.
    11. Naveen Kumar Jain & Tanvi Kothari & Vikas Kumar, 2016. "Location Choice Research: Proposing New Agenda," Management International Review, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 303-324, June.
    12. E. Allevi & G. Oggioni & R. Riccardi & M. Rocco, 2017. "An equilibrium model for the cement sector: EU-ETS analysis with power contracts," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 255(1), pages 63-93, August.
    13. Luis Cabral & Gabriel Natividad, 2018. "Exporting Movies: Country Proximity, Release Strategy, and Performance," Working Papers 18-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    14. Boehe, Dirk Michael & Becerra, Manuel, 2022. "Market entry into new export markets: When are firms more likely to imitate their competitors’ market presence?," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(5).
    15. Jin, Tuofu & Eapen, Alex, 2022. "‘Delayed Forbearance’: Multipoint contact and mutual forbearance in inaugural and subsequent competitive actions," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 149(C), pages 938-953.
    16. Raventós, Pedro & Zolezzi, Sandro, 2016. "Cement in Central America: Global players in a local industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 395-399.

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