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Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies

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  • Garcia-Gallego, Aurora
  • Georgantzis, Nikolaos
  • Gil-Molto, Maria Jose
  • Orts, Vicente

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  • Garcia-Gallego, Aurora & Georgantzis, Nikolaos & Gil-Molto, Maria Jose & Orts, Vicente, 2006. "Game-theoretic aspects of international mergers: Theory and case studies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 395-409, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:26:y:2006:i:3:p:395-409
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jalal D. Akhavein & Allen N. Berger & David B. Humphrey, "undated". "The Effects of Megamergers on Efficiency and Prices: Evidence from a Bank Profit Function," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1997-09, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), revised 10 Dec 2019.
    2. Farrell, Joseph & Shapiro, Carl, 1990. "Horizontal Mergers: An Equilibrium Analysis," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 107-126, March.
    3. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 2001. "Multimarket Contact, Imperfect Monitoring, and Implicit Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 158-178, May.
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    6. Steven Pilloff, 1999. "Multimarket Contact in Banking," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 14(2), pages 163-182, March.
    7. Spagnolo, Giancarlo, 1999. "On Interdependent Supergames: Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 127-139, November.
    8. Fisher, Franklin M, 1987. "Horizontal Mergers: Triage and Treatment," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 1(2), pages 23-40, Fall.
    9. Martin, Stephen, 2001. "Industrial Organization: A European Perspective," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198297284.
    10. Meghan R. Busse, 2000. "Multimarket Contact and Price Coordination in the Cellular Telephone Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(3), pages 287-320, June.
    11. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919.
    12. Ordover, Janusz A & Willig, Robert D, 1985. "Antitrust for High-Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and Mergers," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(2), pages 311-333, May.
    13. Philip M. Parker & Lars-Hendrik Roller, 1997. "Collusive Conduct in Duopolies: Multimarket Contact and Cross-Ownership in the Mobile Telephone Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 304-322, Summer.
    14. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-426, October.
    15. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
    16. Lucio Fuentelsaz & Jaime Gómez, "undated". "Multipoint Competition, Mutual Forbearance and Entry into Geographic Markets," Studies on the Spanish Economy 127, FEDEA.
    17. Fernandez, Nerea & Marin, Pedro L, 1998. "Market Power and Multimarket Contact: Some Evidence from the Spanish Hotel Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 301-315, September.
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