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Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of Policy Reform

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  • Horowitz, John K.
  • Just, Richard E.

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Suggested Citation

  • Horowitz, John K. & Just, Richard E., 1994. "Political Coalition Breaking and Sustainability of Policy Reform," Working Papers 197811, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:umdrwp:197811
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.197811
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    File URL: https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/197811/files/agecon-maryland-94-33.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Thomson,William & Lensberg,Terje, 2006. "Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining with a Variable Number of Agents," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521027038, December.
    2. Ordeshook,Peter C., 1986. "Game Theory and Political Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521315937, December.
    3. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, Leo K., 1992. "A Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt1p67k0dp, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    4. Beghin, John C. & Karp, Larry S., 1991. "Estimation of price policies in Senegal An empirical test of cooperative game theory," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(1), pages 49-67, January.
    5. Hart, Sergiu & Kurz, Mordecai, 1983. "Endogenous Formation of Coalitions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 1047-1064, July.
    6. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    7. Rausser, Gordon C. & Simon, L., 1990. "Noncooperative Model of Collective Decision Making: A Multilateral Bargaining Approach," Staff General Research Papers Archive 819, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    8. Honadle, George & Cooper, Lauren, 1989. "Beyond coordination and control: An interorganizational approach to structural adjustment, service delivery, and natural resource management," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 17(10), pages 1531-1541, October.
    9. Merlo, A. & Wilson, C., 1993. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information and Non-Transferable Utility," Working Papers 93-06, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    10. Merlo, A. & Wilson, C., 1992. "A stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining eith Complete Information and Transferable Utility," Working Papers 92-34, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
    11. Chan, Kenneth S., 1991. "Bilateral trade negotiations and trade diversification : Evidence from semi-industrialized countries," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 243-257, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Mash, 1999. "The Investment Response to Imperfectly Credible Trade Liberalisation with Endogenous Probability of Reversal," Economics Series Working Papers WPS/1998-13, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.

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