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R&D organization and technology transfer

Author

Listed:
  • Arijit Mukherjee

    (Keele University, Department of Economics)

  • Sugata Marjit

    (Centre for Studies in Social Sciences, Calcutta, India)

Abstract

We use a duopoly to show how the possibility of licensing ex post R&D affects the decision on R&D organization. We show that whether licensing ex post R&D affects the incentive for doing cooperative R&D depends on the nature of cooperative R&D. If the firms do cooperative R&D to avoid duplication in R&D process then the possibility of licensing ex post R&D may influence the decision on R&D organization provided one firm behaves like a Stackelberg leader in the product market. If the firms behave like Cournot duopolists then the possibility of licensing ex post R&D can influence the decision on R&D when the firms do cooperative R&D to share the cost of doing R&D. In the course of analysis, we show the implication of horizontal product differentiation on the R&D organization and technology licensing. Further, we show the importance of monetary transfer under cooperative R&D.

Suggested Citation

  • Arijit Mukherjee & Sugata Marjit, 2001. "R&D organization and technology transfer," Keele Department of Economics Discussion Papers (1995-2001) 2001/02, Department of Economics, Keele University.
    • Handle: RePEc:kee:keeldp:2001/02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Combs, K. L., 1992. "Cost sharing vs. multiple research projects in cooperative R&D," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 39(3), pages 353-357, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arijit Mukherjee & Achintya Ray, 2009. "Unsuccessful patent application and cooperative R&D," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(3), pages 251-263, July.
    2. Abhishek Kabiraj, 2018. "R&D cooperation in a three-firm Cournot industry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1541-1546.
    3. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2018. "On the Choice of R&D Organization," MPRA Paper 87503, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2019. "Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Cooperation in R&D," MPRA Paper 94676, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2023. "Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative R&D under Uncertain Probability of Success," MPRA Paper 117623, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Licensing; Multiple research project; Research joint venture;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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