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On International compensations for environmental stocks

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  • Frank Stähler

Abstract

This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner may influence the compensation price strategically. If the incentive to raise the compensation price dominates the preservation incentive, the steady-state stock falls short from that which is voluntarily held. Whether compensation policies can neglect this feature depends crucially on the institutional setting which determines the compensation price. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Suggested Citation

  • Frank Stähler, 1996. "On International compensations for environmental stocks," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(1), pages 1-13, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:8:y:1996:i:1:p:1-13
    DOI: 10.1007/BF00340650
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Mohr, Ernst & Thomas, Jonathan P., 1998. "Pooling sovereign risks: The case of environmental treaties and international debt," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 173-190, February.
    4. William D. Nordhaus, 1973. "The Allocation of Energy Resources," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 4(3), pages 529-576.
    5. Stähler, Frank, 1992. "Pareto improvements by in-kind-transfers," Kiel Working Papers 541, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Stahler, Frank, 1994. "Biological diversity: The international management of genetic resources and its impact on biotechnology," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 227-236, December.
    7. Mohr, Ernst, 1993. "Sustainable development and international distribution: Theory and application to rainforests as carbon sinks," Kiel Working Papers 602, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    8. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
    9. Nunnenkamp, Peter, 1992. "International financing of environmental protection: North-South conflicts on concepts and financial instruments and possible solutions," Kiel Working Papers 512, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    Cited by:

    1. Ollivier, Hélène, 2012. "Growth, deforestation and the efficiency of the REDD mechanism," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 312-327.
    2. Anders Skonhoft & Wenting Chen, 2011. "On the management of interconnected wildlife populations," Working Paper Series 12311, Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology.
    3. Deke, Oliver, 2004. "Financing National Protected Area Networks Internationally: The Global Environment Facility as a Multilateral Mechanism of Transfer," Kiel Working Papers 1227, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    4. Azqueta Oyarzún, Diego & Sotelsek, Daniel F., 1999. "Comparative advantages and the exploitation of environmental resources," Revista CEPAL, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), August.
    5. Lafforgue, Gilles & Ollivier, Hélène, 2011. "Optimal policies to preserve tropical forests," LERNA Working Papers 11.14.348, LERNA, University of Toulouse.
    6. Fouad El Ouardighi & Eugene Khmelnitsky & Marc Leandri, 2020. "Production-based pollution versus deforestation: optimal policy with state-independent and-dependent environmental absorption efficiency restoration process," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 292(1), pages 1-26, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    international compensations; strategic behaviour; international environmental problems; environmental stocks;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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