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Climate Change : Behavioral Responses from Extreme Events and Delayed Damages

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  • Ghidoni, Riccardo

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Calzolari, G.
  • Casari, Marco

Abstract

Understanding how to sustain cooperation in the climate change global dilemma is crucial to mitigate its harmful consequences. Damages from climate change typically occur after long delays and can take the form of more frequent realizations of extreme and random events. These features generate a decoupling between emissions and their damages, which we study through a laboratory experiment. We find that some decision-makers respond to global emissions, as expected, while others respond to realized damages also when emissions are observable. On balance, the presence of delayed/stochastic consequences did not impair cooperation. However, we observed a worrisome increasing trend of emissions when damages hit with delay.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ghidoni, Riccardo & Calzolari, G. & Casari, Marco, 2017. "Climate Change : Behavioral Responses from Extreme Events and Delayed Damages," Other publications TiSEM 081ac6f7-78e3-4c05-9b0a-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:081ac6f7-78e3-4c05-9b0a-4230e4e0d9f9
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    Cited by:

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    2. Casari, Marco & Tavoni, Alessandro, 2024. "Climate clubs in the laboratory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
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    4. P. Battiston & L. Chollete & S. Harrison, 2022. "May The Forcing Be With You: Experimental Evidence on Mandatory Contributions to Public Goods," Economics Department Working Papers 2022-EP01, Department of Economics, Parma University (Italy).
    5. Sanjit Dhami & Narges Hajimoladarvish & Pavan Mamidi, 2023. "Climate Change Risk, and Human Behavior: Theory and Evidence," CESifo Working Paper Series 10678, CESifo.
    6. Naidu, Dharmendra & Ranjeeni, Kumari, 2021. "Effect of coronavirus fear on the performance of Australian stock returns: Evidence from an event study," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    7. Pevnitskaya, Svetlana & Ryvkin, Dmitry, 2022. "The effect of access to clean technology on pollution reduction: An experiment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 117-141.
    8. He, Pinglin & Zhang, Shuhao & Wang, Lei & Ning, Jing, 2023. "Will environmental taxes help to mitigate climate change? A comparative study based on OECD countries," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C), pages 1440-1464.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming

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