On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making
International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
Volume (Year): 11 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (April)
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