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Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution

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  • CURRARINI, Sergio

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium and Iowa State University, Department of Economics, Ames, United-States)

  • TULKENS, Henry

    (Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), Université catholique de Louvain (UCL), Louvain la Neuve, Belgium)

Abstract

International agreements on transfrontier pollution issues require ap- proval by domestic political institutions. In this paper we employ a voting game theoretic model to characterize the stability of such agreements when each country’s participation is conditioned upon a domestic ratification vote. To describe pre-treaty or no treaty situ- ations, we propose a concept of (noncooperative) political equilibrium, and prove its existence. Then, we show that the set of cooperative joint policies (yielding a treaty) that are ratified by all countries is nonempty. Moreover, in our model, the unique agreement so ratified corresponds to the ratio equilibrium allocation of the international economy with the noncooperative equilibrium allocation as initial endowment.

Suggested Citation

  • CURRARINI, Sergio & TULKENS, Henry, 1997. "Core-theoretic and political stability of international agreements on transfrontier pollution," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 1997093, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:1997093
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Scott Barret, 1998. "On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 11(3), pages 317-333, April.
    2. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1998. "International Institutions and Environmental Policy: International environmental agreements: Incentives and political economy1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 561-572, May.

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