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Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries

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  • Nicolas Quérou
  • Agnès Tomini

Abstract

This paper addresses the management of multispecies sheries, and suggests the use of restricted shing policies as an interesting option for unassessed sheries (as is the case within developing countries). Specically, we consider a predator-prey system where agents compete to harvest from two interacting sh species. Two management policies are considered: an unrestricted regime where agents can harvest from both species, and a second one where only the predators can be harvested. The performance of both policies is compared from an ecological and an economic point of view. For a suciently large number of agents (or for strong biological interaction parameters) the restricted shing policy is shown to yield both higher long run stock levels and prots. Thus, this contribution suggests that such a policy would require very little monitoring while meeting environmental and economic objectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicolas Quérou & Agnès Tomini, 2012. "Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries," Working Papers 12-32, LAMETA, Universtiy of Montpellier, revised Oct 2012.
  • Handle: RePEc:lam:wpaper:12-32
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    Cited by:

    1. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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