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On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters

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  • Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk
  • Lindroos, Marko

Abstract

Game-theoretic models of fisheries typically consider cases where some players harvest a single common fish stock. However, these types of models do not capture many real-world mixed fisheries, where species can be biologically independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where several non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is targeting the preservation of biodiversity by setting up a two-species model with the aim of exploring the conditions under which both species can survive exploitation under non-cooperative management. The model starts out as a two-species model without biological dependency and is then modified to also include biological dependency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the maximum number of players that can preserve both species while satisfying the model's conditions. For visualization purposes, we simulate a two-species model with different kinds of interrelationships.

Suggested Citation

  • Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk & Lindroos, Marko, 2010. "On Species Preservation and Non-Cooperative Exploiters," Strategic Behavior and the Environment, now publishers, vol. 1(1), pages 49-70, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:now:jnlsbe:102.00000004
    DOI: 10.1561/102.00000004
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Fischer, Ronald D. & Mirman, Leonard J., 1996. "The Compleat Fish Wars: Biological and Dynamic Interactions," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 34-42, January.
    2. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
    3. Sumaila, U.R., 1997. "Strategic Dynamic Interaction: The Case of Barents Sea Fisheries," Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen 172, Department of Economics, University of Bergen.
    4. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1983. "Optimal harvesting of ecologically interdependent fish species," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(4), pages 329-345, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    2. Quérou, N. & Tomini, A., 2013. "Managing interacting species in unassessed fisheries," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 192-201.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Species preservation; Bioeconomic modeling; Two-species fisheries; Non-cooperative game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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