Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations
Economic models of regulatory compliance in fisheries usually assume an instrumental determination of individual behavior in which the decision to comply or to violate depends primarily on the expected monetary costs and benefits. Policy implications tend, as a result, to focus only on deterrence, that is, increasing the expected monetary costs of violation. More complete models of compliance behavior take into account factors such a social influence, moral values, and the perceived legitimacy of regulations and the regulatory authority. The paper describes an investigation into the non-monetary factors affecting compliance with output (quota) restrictions among fishermen in the United Kingdom.
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