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Property rights with biological spillovers: when Hardin meets Meade

  • BALESTRA, Carlotta

    ()

    (Université catholique de Louvain , CORE and Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics and Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • BRECHET, Thierry

    ()

    (Université catholique de Louvain , CORE and Chair Lhoist Berghmans in Environmental Economics and Management, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

  • LAMBRECHT, Stéphane

    ()

    (Universités de Lille, Faculté des Sciences Economiques et Sociales, Université Lille 1 Sciences et Technologies, Laboratoire EQUIPPE, France and Université catholique de Louvain, CORE, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium)

In an overlapping generations setup we address the issue of the optimal number of property rights to allocate over a natural resource when the goal is to maximize the stock of the natural resource at the steady state. We assume that the effect of the property rights regime on the evolution of the resource is twofold: through biological spillovers and through monitoring costs. Property rights are assigned to local communities, which can decide whether to cooperate or not. The outcome in the strategic setting is hence compared to the one in the cooperative setup. A fiscal policy able to decentralize the cooperative outcome is studied.

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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2010071.

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Date of creation: 01 Nov 2010
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2010071
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