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Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation

  • McCarthy, Nancy
  • Sadoulet, Elisabeth
  • de Janvry, Alain

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ6-4581793-4/2/36df889c534ab8c19cdb539b001e9515
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Environmental Economics and Management.

Volume (Year): 42 (2001)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 297-309

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:42:y:2001:i:3:p:297-309
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622870

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  1. McCarthy, Nancy & de Janvry, Alain & Sadoulet, Elisabeth, 1998. "Land allocation under dual individual-collective use in Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 239-264, August.
  2. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
  3. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
  4. Ahuja, Vinod, 1998. "Land degradation, agricultural productivity and common property: evidence from C te d'Ivoire," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 3(01), pages 7-34, February.
  5. Sandler, Todd & Cauley, Jon & Tschirhart, John, 1983. "Toward a Unified Theory of Nonmarket Institutional Structures," Australian Economic Papers, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(4), pages 233-54, June.
  6. Charles F. Mason & Stephen Polasky, 1997. "The Optimal Number of Firms in the Commons: A Dynamic Approach," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 1143-60, November.
  7. Lopez, Ramon, 1998. "The Tragedy of the Commons in Cote d'Ivoire Agriculture: Empirical Evidence and Implications for Evaluating Trade Policies," World Bank Economic Review, World Bank Group, vol. 12(1), pages 105-31, January.
  8. Alain De Janvry & Nancy McCarthy & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 1998. "Endogenous Provision and Appropriation in the Commons," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 80(3), pages 658-664.
  9. Bardhan, Pranab, 1993. "Analytics of the institutions of informal cooperation in rural development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 633-639, April.
  10. Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1991. "Group Lending, Repayment Incentives And Social Collateral," Papers 152, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Development Studies.
  11. Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
  12. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-22, December.
  13. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
  14. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1997. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons: Part I: The Unregulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(4), pages 451-82, October.
  15. Wilson, Paul N & Thompson, Gary D, 1993. "Common Property and Uncertainty: Compensating Coalitions by Mexico's Patoral Ejidatarios," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 41(2), pages 299-318, January.
  16. Mason, Charles F. & Sandler, Todd & Cornes, Richard, 1988. "Expectations, the commons, and optimal group size," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 99-110, March.
  17. Paul Seabright, 1993. "Managing Local Commons: Theoretical Issues in Incentive Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 113-134, Fall.
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