IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/gii/ciesrp/cies_rp_30.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Resistance to the Regulation of Common Resources in Rural Tunisia

Author

Listed:
  • Xiaoying Liu
  • Mare Sarr
  • Timothy Swanson

    (School of Economics, University of Cape Town, South Africa)

Abstract

We examine the effect of the introduction of uniform water-charging for aquifer management and provide evidence using a survey-based choice experiment of agricultural water users in rural Tunisia. Theoretically, we show that the implementation of the proposed second-best regulation would result both in efficiency gains and in distributional effects in favour of small landholders. Empirically, we find that resistance to the introduction of an effective water-charging regime is greatest amongst the largest landholders. Resistance to the regulation of common resources may be rooted in the manner in which heterogeneity might determine the distributional impact of different management regimes.

Suggested Citation

  • Xiaoying Liu & Mare Sarr & Timothy Swanson, 2014. "Resistance to the Regulation of Common Resources in Rural Tunisia," CIES Research Paper series 30-2014, Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:gii:ciesrp:cies_rp_30
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://repec.graduateinstitute.ch/pdfs/ciesrp/CIES_RP_30.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Scott J. Savage & Donald M. Waldman, 2008. "Learning and fatigue during choice experiments: a comparison of online and mail survey modes," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(3), pages 351-371.
    2. Edella Schlager & Elinor Ostrom, 1992. "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 68(3), pages 249-262.
    3. Johnson, Ronald N & Libecap, Gary D, 1982. "Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 1005-1022, December.
    4. Elinor Ostrom & Roy Gardner, 1993. "Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons: Self-Governing Irrigation Systems Can Work," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(4), pages 93-112, Fall.
    5. Carlsson, Fredrik & Raun Mørkbak, Morten & Bøye Olsen, Søren, 2010. "The first time is the hardest: A test of ordering effects in choice experiments," Working Papers in Economics 470, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
    6. Baland, J-M & Platteau, J-P, 1997. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons," Papers 193, Notre-Dame de la Paix, Sciences Economiques et Sociales.
    7. Revankar, Nagesh S, 1971. "A Class of Variable Elasticity of Substitution Production Functions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 39(1), pages 61-71, January.
    8. Molle, Francois & Wester, Philippus (ed.), 2009. "River basin trajectories: societies, environments and development," IWMI Books, International Water Management Institute, number 137953.
    9. Bardhan, Pranab & Ghatak, Maitreesh & Karaivanov, Alexander, 2007. "Wealth inequality and collective action," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(9), pages 1843-1874, September.
    10. Elinor Ostrom, 2000. "Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 137-158, Summer.
    11. Kakwani, Nanak C & Podder, N, 1976. "Efficient Estimation of the Lorenz Curve and Associated Inequality Measures from Grouped Observations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 44(1), pages 137-148, January.
    12. Train,Kenneth E., 2009. "Discrete Choice Methods with Simulation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521747387, September.
    13. Pfeiffer, Lisa & Lin, C.-Y. Cynthia, 2012. "Groundwater pumping and spatial externalities in agriculture," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 16-30.
    14. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2003. "Economics of common property management regimes," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 127-190, Elsevier.
    15. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 1998. "Wealth Inequality and Efficiency in the Commons, Part II: The Regulated Case," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(1), pages 1-22, January.
    16. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August.
    17. Cardenas, Juan-Camilo, 2003. "Real wealth and experimental cooperation: experiments in the field lab," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 263-289, April.
    18. C. F. Sirmans & Arnold L. Redman, 1979. "apital-Land Substitution and the Price Elasticity of Demand for Urban Residential Land," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 54(2), pages 167-176.
    19. Bardhan, Pranab, 2000. "Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(4), pages 847-865, July.
    20. Provencher Bill & Burt Oscar, 1993. "The Externalities Associated with the Common Property Exploitation of Groundwater," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 139-158, March.
    21. Le Goulven, P. & Leduc, C. & Bachta, M. S. & Poussin, J. C., 2009. "Sharing scarce resources in a Mediterranean River Basin: Wadi Merguellil in central Tunisia," IWMI Books, Reports H042452, International Water Management Institute.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hanan G. Jacoby & Ghazala Mansuri, 2018. "Governing the Commons? Water and Power in Pakistan’s Indus Basin," Working Papers id:12933, eSocialSciences.
    2. Gary D. Libecap, 2014. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 52(2), pages 424-479, June.
    3. Baland, Jean-Marie & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2003. "Economics of common property management regimes," Handbook of Environmental Economics, in: K. G. Mäler & J. R. Vincent (ed.), Handbook of Environmental Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 4, pages 127-190, Elsevier.
    4. Aggarwal, Rimjhim & Narayan, Tulika A., 2000. "Does Inequality Lead To Greater Efficiency In The Use Of Local Commons? The Role Of Strategic Investments In Capacity," Working Papers 28572, University of Maryland, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    5. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala & Fatima, Freeha, 2021. "Decentralizing corruption: Irrigation reform in Pakistan," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 202(C).
    6. Jeff Dayton-Johnson & Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 577-602, July.
    7. Naidu, Sirisha C., 2009. "Heterogeneity and Collective Management: Evidence from Common Forests in Himachal Pradesh, India," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 676-686, March.
    8. Rucha Ghate, 2008. "Ensuring ‘Collective Action’ in ‘Participatory’ Forest Management," Working Papers id:1759, eSocialSciences.
    9. Tim Johnson & Oleg Smirnov, 2012. "An alternative mechanism through which economic inequality facilitates collective action: Wealth disparities as a sign of cooperativeness," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(4), pages 461-484, October.
    10. Gary D. Libecap, 2013. "Addressing Global Environmental Externalities: Transaction Costs Considerations," NBER Working Papers 19501, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Ruttan, Lore M., 2008. "Economic Heterogeneity and the Commons: Effects on Collective Action and Collective Goods Provisioning," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(5), pages 969-985, May.
    12. McCarthy, Nancy & Sadoulet, Elisabeth & de Janvry, Alain, 2001. "Common Pool Resource Appropriation under Costly Cooperation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 297-309, November.
    13. Jacoby, Hanan G. & Mansuri, Ghazala, 2020. "Enforcement for sale: Lobbying for water in Pakistan's Indus Basin," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).
    14. Nicolas Faysse, 2005. "Coping with the Tragedy of the Commons: Game Structure and Design of Rules," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(2), pages 239-261, April.
    15. Pilar Useche, 2016. "Who Contributes to the Provision of Public Goods at the Community Level? The Case of Potable Water in Ghana," Development Policy Review, Overseas Development Institute, vol. 34(6), pages 869-888, November.
    16. Alberto Alesina & Eliana La Ferrara, 2003. "Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2028, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    17. Pranab Mukhopadhyay, "undated". "Heterogeneity, Commons and Privitization: Agrarian Institutional Change in Goa," Working papers 22, The South Asian Network for Development and Environmental Economics.
    18. Poteete, Amy R. & Ostrom, Elinor, 2004. "In pursuit of comparable concepts and data about collective action," Agricultural Systems, Elsevier, vol. 82(3), pages 215-232, December.
    19. Fijnanda van Klingeren & Nan Dirk de Graaf, 2021. "Heterogeneity, trust and common-pool resource management," Journal of Environmental Studies and Sciences, Springer;Association of Environmental Studies and Sciences, vol. 11(1), pages 37-64, March.
    20. Du Bois, Rodrigo Salcedo & Macias, Miguel Angel Gutierrez, 2013. "Cooperation makes it happen? Groundwater management in Aguascalientes, Mexico: An experimental approach," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 151139, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q25 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Water

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:gii:ciesrp:cies_rp_30. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Kristine Kjeldsen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ciheich.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.