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Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use

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  • Tarui, Nori

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  • Tarui, Nori, 2007. "Inequality and outside options in common-property resource use," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 83(1), pages 214-239, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:83:y:2007:i:1:p:214-239
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    1. Mason, Charles F. & Polasky, Stephen, 2005. "What motivates membership in non-renewable resource cartels?: The case of OPEC," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 321-342, November.
    2. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Repeated Games Played by Overlapping Generations of Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 81-92.
    3. Benhabib, Jess & Radner, Roy, 1992. "The Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset: A Game-Theoretic Approach," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 155-190, April.
    4. Rustichini, A, 1992. "Second Best Equilibria for Games of Joint Exploitation of a Productive Asset," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 2(2), pages 191-196, April.
    5. Wiggins, Steven N & Libecap, Gary D, 1987. "Firm Heterogeneities and Cartelization Efforts in Domestic Crude Oil," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-25, Spring.
    6. Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, 2000. "Determinants of collective action on the local commons: a model with evidence from Mexico," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 181-208, June.
    7. Anderson, C. Leigh & Locker, Laura & Nugent, Rachel, 2002. "Microcredit, Social Capital, and Common Pool Resources," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-105, January.
    8. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
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    11. Dayton-Johnson, Jeff, 2000. "Choosing rules to govern the commons: a model with evidence from Mexico," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 19-41, May.
    12. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    13. Jodha, N.S., 1992. "Common Property Resources; A Missing Dimension of development Strategies," World Bank - Discussion Papers 168, World Bank.
    14. Smith, Lones, 1992. "Folk theorems in overlapping generations games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 426-449, July.
    15. Dutta Prajit K., 1995. "Collusion, Discounting and Dynamic Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 289-306, June.
    16. Jeff Dayton-Johnson & Pranab Bardhan, 2002. "Inequality And Conservation On The Local Commons: A Theoretical Exercise," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(481), pages 577-602, July.
    17. Bardhan, Pranab, 2000. "Irrigation and Cooperation: An Empirical Analysis of 48 Irrigation Communities in South India," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 48(4), pages 847-865, July.
    18. Matthew A. Turner, 1997. "Parental Altruism and Common Property Regulation," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 809-821, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Heintzelman, Martin D. & Salant, Stephen W. & Schott, Stephan, 2009. "Putting free-riding to work: A Partnership Solution to the common-property problem," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 309-320, May.
    2. Fenske, James, 2014. "Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the Commons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(1), pages 39-68, March.
    3. Nicolas Quérou & Agnes Tomini & Christopher Costello, 2020. "Limited tenure concessions for collective goods," Post-Print hal-03057036, HAL.
    4. Fenske, James, 2014. "Imachi Nkwu: Trade and the Commons," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(01), pages 39-68, March.

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