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Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

Author

Listed:
  • Michael Finus

    (University of Stirling)

  • Pedro Pintassilgo

    (University of Algarve)

  • Marko Lindroos

    (University of Helsinki)

  • Gordon Munro

    (Centre for the Economics and Management of Aquatic Resources, University of Portsmouth)

Abstract

According to international law, straddling fish stocks should preferably be managed cooperatively through regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). This paper analyzes the stability and success of these organizations through a game in partition function form based on the classical Gordon-Schaefer bioeconomic model. A comprehensive analysis of the economic and biological fundamentals that influence the success of coalition formation is provided. The results show that the larger the number of fishing states that compete for the fish stock the higher would be the relative gains from full cooperation, but the lower is the likelihood of large RFMOs being stable. It is also shown that the success of coalition formation is positively correlated with the degree of production cost asymmetry among fishing states and negatively with the overall level of efficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Finus & Pedro Pintassilgo & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2008. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Working Papers 2008.20, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  • Handle: RePEc:fem:femwpa:2008.20
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Costello, Christopher & Quérou, Nicolas & Tomini, Agnes, 2015. "Partial enclosure of the commons," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 69-78.
    2. Blasiak, Robert & Yagi, Nobuyuki & Kurokura, Hisashi, 2015. "Impacts of hegemony and shifts in dominance on marine capture fisheries," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 52-58.
    3. Michael Finus & Raoul Schneider & Pedro Pintassilgo, 2011. "The Incentive Structure of Impure Public Good Provision – The Case of International Fisheries," Discussion Papers 1103, Exeter University, Department of Economics.
    4. Toumasatos, Evangelos & Steinshamn, Stein Ivar, 2017. "Coalition Formation with Externalities: The Case of the Northeast Atlantic Mackerel Fishery in a Pre and Post Brexit Context," Discussion Papers 2017/11, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    5. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    6. Basak Bayramoglu & Brian Copeland & Jean-François Jacques, 2016. "Trade and Fisheries Subsidies," Working Papers 2016.08, FAERE - French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists.
    7. Wallace, Scott & Turris, Bruce & Driscoll, John & Bodtker, Karin & Mose, Brian & Munro, Gordon, 2015. "Canada's Pacific groundfish trawl habitat agreement: A global first in an ecosystem approach to bottom trawl impacts," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 240-248.
    8. Emmi Nieminen & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2016. "International Agreements in the Multispecies Baltic Sea Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 109-134, September.
    9. Xiaozi Liu & Marko Lindroos & Leif Sandal, 2016. "Sharing a Fish Stock When Distribution and Harvest Costs are Density Dependent," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(3), pages 665-686, March.
    10. Adam Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard, 2016. "Farsightedness, Changing Stock Location and the Stability of International Fisheries Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(3), pages 591-611, March.
    11. Meißner, Nathalie, 2013. "The incentives of private companies to invest in protected area certificates: How coalitions can improve ecosystem sustainability," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 148-158.
    12. Michèle Breton & Michel Keoula, 2012. "Farsightedness in a Coalitional Great Fish War," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 51(2), pages 297-315, February.
    13. Adam N. Walker & Hans-Peter Weikard & Andries Richter, 2015. "The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse," Working Papers 2015.60, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    14. Michael Finus & Dirk Rübbelke, 2013. "Public Good Provision and Ancillary Benefits: The Case of Climate Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 56(2), pages 211-226, October.
    15. repec:eee:resene:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:16-32 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Breton, Michèle & Keoula, Michel Yevenunye, 2014. "A great fish war model with asymmetric players," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C), pages 209-223.
    17. Pintassilgo, Pedro & Laukkanen, Marita & Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk & Lindroos, Marko, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements and Non-consumptive Values," Discussion Papers of Business and Economics 8/2015, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Business and Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Straddling Fish Stock; Regional Fisheries Management Organizations; Unregulated Fishing; Bioeconomic Model; Coalition Formation Model; Free-Riding;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery

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