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An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions

  • Lone Grønbæk Kronbak


    (Department of Environmental and Business Economics, University of Southern Denmark)

  • Marko Lindroos


    (Department of Economics and Management, University of Helsinki)

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among au-thorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort com-pared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery.

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Paper provided by University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics in its series Working Papers with number 50/03.

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Length: 47 pages
Date of creation: Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:sdk:wpaper:50
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  1. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2002. "The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A Strategic Approach -," Working Papers 31/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
  2. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July.
  3. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
  4. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
  5. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 276-, June.
  6. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
  8. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
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