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Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?

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  • Elizabeth Robinson

    (Department of Economics, University of Oxford)

Abstract

This paper asks under what conditions it is possible for a wildlife department in west Africa without an external budget to protect all rare and endangered species, and if so, what is the impact on rural inhabitants engaged in hunting. Protecting wildlife in this region is particularly tricky. Hunting is important for rural livelihoods, but when unregulated can result in the loss of species. Government funding for wildlife departments is rarely sufficient and so they must increasingly look towards revenue- generating activities such as the sale of permits for hunting common species combined with fines for those caught with rare species.

Suggested Citation

  • Elizabeth Robinson, 2004. "Wanted dead and alive: Are hunting and protection of endangered species compatible?," Development and Comp Systems 0409066, EconWPA.
  • Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpdc:0409066
    Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23
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    File URL: http://econwpa.repec.org/eps/dev/papers/0409/0409066.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    2. A. Mitchell Polinsky, 1979. "Private versus Public Enforcement of Fines," NBER Working Papers 0338, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters,in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, 1974. "The Private Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 0062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "A note on private enforcement and type-I error," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 423-429, September.
    6. Niv (Burnovski), Moshe Bar & Safra, Zvi, 2002. "On the social desirability of wealth-dependent fine policies," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 53-59, July.
    7. Lear, Kelly Kristen & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 127-148, September.
    8. Rodriguez-Ibeas, Roberto, 2002. "Regulatory Enforcement with Discretionary Fining and Litigation," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(2), pages 105-118, April.
    9. Shavell, Steven, 1993. "The Optimal Structure of Law Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(1), pages 255-287, April.
    10. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • O - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth
    • P - Economic Systems

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