Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries
This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing and managing forest and wildlife access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly in Tanzania and southern India, detail the major pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identified large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple layers of enforcement, different incentives faced by those responsible for enforcement, and conflict between protected-area managers’ job requirements and rural people’s needs.
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- Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Heidi J. Albers, 2006.
"Parks, Buffer Zones, and Costly Enforcement,"
CSAE Working Paper Series
2006-15, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
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- Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Jeffrey C. Williams & Heidi J. Albers, 2002. "The Influence of Markets and Policy on Spatial Patterns of Non-Timber Forest Product Extraction," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(2), pages 260-271.
- Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
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- Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-66, June.
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