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Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries

Author

Listed:
  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z.
  • Kumar, Ajay Mahaputra
  • Albers, Heidi J.

Abstract

This paper relates the key findings of the optimal economic enforcement literature to practical issues of enforcing and managing forest and wildlife access restrictions in developing countries. Our experiences, particularly in Tanzania and southern India, detail the major pragmatic issues facing those responsible for protecting natural resources. We identified large gaps in the theoretical literature that limit its ability to inform practical management, including issues of limited funding and cost recovery, multiple layers of enforcement, different incentives faced by those responsible for enforcement, and conflict between protected-area managers’ job requirements and rural people’s needs.

Suggested Citation

  • Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z. & Kumar, Ajay Mahaputra & Albers, Heidi J., 2009. "Optimal Enforcement and Practical Issues of Resource Protection in Developing Countries," Discussion Papers dp-09-08-efd, Resources For the Future.
  • Handle: RePEc:rff:dpaper:dp-09-08-efd
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    File URL: http://www.rff.org/RFF/documents/EfD-DP-09-08.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Clarke, Harry R. & Reed, William J. & Shrestha, Ram M., 1993. "Optimal enforcement of property rights on developing country forests subject to illegal logging," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 271-293, September.
    2. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Heidi J. Albers, 2006. "Parks, Buffer Zones, and Costly Enforcement," CSAE Working Paper Series 2006-15, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    3. Albers, Heidi J. & Robinson, Elizabeth J.Z., 2007. "Spatial-temporal aspects of cost-benefit analysis for park management: An example from Khao Yai National Park, Thailand," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2-3), pages 129-150, August.
    4. Lear, Kelly Kristen & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 127-148, September.
    5. Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson & Jeffrey C. Williams & Heidi J. Albers, 2002. "The Influence of Markets and Policy on Spatial Patterns of Non-Timber Forest Product Extraction," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 78(2), pages 260-271.
    6. Smith, Martin D. & Wilen, James E., 2003. "Economic impacts of marine reserves: the importance of spatial behavior," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 183-206, September.
    7. Friedman, David & Sjostrom, William, 1993. "Hanged for a Sheep--The Economics of Marginal Deterrence," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 22(2), pages 345-366, June.
    8. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Albers, H.J., 2010. "Spatial modeling of extraction and enforcement in developing country protected areas," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 165-179, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    optimal enforcement; protected-area management; non-timber forest products; conflict; India;

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q34 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Natural Resources and Domestic and International Conflicts

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