A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery
The paper sets up a discrete-time, deterministic, coalition game model among the major agents exploiting the cod stock in Baltic Sea. The characteristic func-tion is constructed and the Shapley value and the nucleolus are used as one-point solution concepts. The paper identifies the problem with these sharing rules and develops a new sharing rule which takes into account the stability of cooperation. The paper contributes to the literature by introducing a connection between cooperative games (sharing rules) and non-cooperative games (stabil-ity).
|Date of creation:||Mar 2004|
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- Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006.
"An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions,"
Environmental & Resource Economics,
European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
- Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2003. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions," Working Papers 50/03, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Environmental and Business Economics.
- Chander, Parkash & Tulkens, Henry, 1994.
"The Core of an Economy With Multilateral Environmental Externalities,"
886, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Henry Tulkens & Parkash Chander, 1997. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 379-401.
- CHANDER, Parkash & TULKENS, Henry, 1995. "The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities," CORE Discussion Papers 1995050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Chander, P. & Tulkens, H., . "The core of an economy with multilateral environmental externalities," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1276, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
- Sumaila, Ussif Rashid, 1999. "A review of game-theoretic models of fishing," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 1-10, January.
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