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An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions

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  • Lone Kronbak

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  • Marko Lindroos

Abstract

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities affects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less co-operation among fishermen, while in the case of low control effort, coalitions are somewhat self-enforcing. The paper further discusses how the optimal enforcement level changes when the coalition formation among authorities changes: centralised, partly centralised and decentralised authorities. We show that decentralised authorities set a lower level of control effort compared to the centralised authorities. The theoretical results are illustrated by simulations of the Baltic Sea cod fishery. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:35:y:2006:i:3:p:169-194
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-006-9012-4
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10640-006-9012-4
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    1. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Caplan, Arthur J. & Silva, Emilson C. D., 1999. "Federal Acid Rain Games," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 25-52, July.
    3. Ruseski, Gorazd, 1998. "International Fish Wars: The Strategic Roles for Fleet Licensing and Effort Subsidies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 70-88, July.
    4. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
    5. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 276-285, June.
    6. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2002. "The Dynamics of an Open Access: The case of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery - A Strategic Approach -," Working Papers 31/02, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    7. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
    8. Hannesson, Rognvaldur, 1997. "Fishing as a Supergame," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 309-322, March.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pedro Pintassilgo & Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2015. "International Fisheries Agreements: A Game Theoretical Approach," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 62(4), pages 689-709, December.
    2. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
    3. Lone Grønbæk Kronbak, 2004. "A Coalition Game of the Baltic Sea Cod Fishery," Working Papers 55/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    4. Diana Dijk & Eligius M. T. Hendrix & Rene Haijema & Rolf A. Groeneveld & Ekko C. Ierland, 2017. "An Adjustment Restriction on Fish Quota: Resource Rents, Overcapacity and Recovery of Fish Stock," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 67(2), pages 203-230, June.
    5. Emmi Nieminen & Lone Grønbæk Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2016. "International Agreements in the Multispecies Baltic Sea Fisheries," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 65(1), pages 109-134, September.
    6. Bayramoglu, Basak & Copeland, Brian R. & Jacques, Jean-Francois, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 13-32.
    7. Pedro Pintassilgo & Michael Finus & Marko Lindroos & Gordon Munro, 2010. "Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 46(3), pages 377-402, July.
    8. van Dijk, Diana & Hendrix, Eligius M.T. & Haijema, Rene & Groeneveld, Rolf A. & van Ierland, Ekko C., 2014. "On solving a bi-level stochastic dynamic programming model for analyzing fisheries policies: Fishermen behavior and optimal fish quota," Ecological Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 272(C), pages 68-75.
    9. Julia Hoffmann & Martin Quaas, 2016. "Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(1), pages 79-93, January.
    10. Basak Bayramoglu & Brian Copeland & Jean-François Jacques, 2018. "Trade and fisheries subsidies [Le commerce international et les subventions à la pêche]," Post-Print hal-02624649, HAL.
    11. Gakushi Ishimura & Sam Herrick & Ussif Sumaila, 2013. "Fishing games under climate variability: transboundary management of Pacific sardine in the California Current System," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(2), pages 189-209, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    coalition formation; fisheries management; quota enforcement; self-enforcing policy; C70; Q22; Q28;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

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