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Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management

Author

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  • Julia Hoffmann
  • Martin Quaas

Abstract

Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discrete time. TACs are fixed by majority decision in a council consisting of decision-makers who are heterogeneous with respect to their discount rates. We show that the optimal feedback strategy for the less patient decision-makers will set inefficiently high TACs in Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium. A binding commitment to a long-term management plan could help solving this problem and lead to a more sustainable fishery management. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2016

Suggested Citation

  • Julia Hoffmann & Martin Quaas, 2016. "Common Pool Politics and Inefficient Fishery Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(1), pages 79-93, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:63:y:2016:i:1:p:79-93
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4
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    Cited by:

    1. Martin F. Quaas & Max T. Stoeven & Bernd Klauer & Thomas Petersen & Johannes Schiller, 2018. "Windows of Opportunity for Sustainable Fisheries Management: The Case of Eastern Baltic Cod," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 70(2), pages 323-341, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fisheries; Fishery economics; Environmental uncertainty; Constant escapement; Political economy; Dynamic game theory; Q22; Q57; D78;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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