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Private Storage of Common Property

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  • Gaudet, Gerard
  • Moreaux, Michel
  • Salant, Stephen W.

Abstract

This paper examines a characteristic of common property problems unmodeled in the published literature: extracted common reserves are often stored privately rather than sold immediately. We examine the positive and normative effects of such storage, Privatization of common reserves through storage may eliminate inefficiency altogether but the premature extraction involved may also exacerbate them-even if rapid extraction does not reduce ultimate recovery.
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Suggested Citation

  • Gaudet, Gerard & Moreaux, Michel & Salant, Stephen W., 2002. "Private Storage of Common Property," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 280-302, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeeman:v:43:y:2002:i:2:p:280-302
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Krugman, Paul, 1979. "A Model of Balance-of-Payments Crises," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 11(3), pages 311-325, August.
    6. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    7. Richard J. Gilbert, 1979. "Optimal Depletion of an Uncertain Stock," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 47-57.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Ngo Long & Gerhard Sorger, 2006. "Insecure property rights and growth: the role of appropriation costs, wealth effects, and heterogeneity," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(3), pages 513-529, August.
    2. Liski, Matti & Montero, Juan-Pablo, 2014. "Forward trading in exhaustible-resource oligopoly," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 122-146.
    3. Jayasri Dutta & Colin Rowat, 2004. "The Road to Extinction: Commons with Capital Markets," GE, Growth, Math methods 0412001, EconWPA.
    4. repec:eee:resene:v:49:y:2017:i:c:p:186-200 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Benchekroun, Hassan & Withagen, Cees, 2012. "On price taking behavior in a nonrenewable resource cartel–fringe game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 355-374.
    6. Benchekroun, H. & Benchekroun, S., 2015. "Harvests' lifespan and North–South market share rivalry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 114-124.
    7. Hotte, Louis & McFerrin, Randy & Wills, Douglas, 2013. "On the dual nature of weak property rights," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 659-678.
    8. Hasegawa, Makoto & Salant, Stephen, 2014. "Cap-and-trade programs under delayed compliance: Consequences of interim injections of permits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 24-34.
    9. Wang, Min & Zhao, Jinhua, 2013. "Monopoly extraction of a nonrenewable resource facing capacity constrained renewable competition," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 503-508.
    10. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W., 2003. "The effects of periodic quotas limiting the stock of imports of durables," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 402-419, April.
    11. Chong Huang, 2011. "Defending Against Speculative Attacks: Reputation, Learning, and Coordination," PIER Working Paper Archive 11-039, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    12. Charles Morcom & Michael Kremer, 2000. "Elephants," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 212-234, March.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q30 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
    • Q32 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Exhaustible Resources and Economic Development

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