On the Dual Nature of Weak Property Rights
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- Alexandre CROUTZET & Pierre LASSERRE, 2016.
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More about this item
KeywordsNatural Resources; Property Rights; Trespass; Theft; Over-Exploitation; Under-Exploitation;
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- N50 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - General, International, or Comparative
- O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-06-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2011-06-04 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-LAW-2011-06-04 (Law & Economics)
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